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Comment

Olmstead v. L.C.-Deinstitutionalization and
Community Integration: An Awakening of
the Nation's Conscience?

I. INTRODUCTION
Olnstead v. L.C.1 is a landmark case that originated in Georgia and
has been lauded as the Brown v. Board of Education for the law of
disability discrimination.2 In June 1999 the United States Supreme
Court decided Olmstead v.L.C.,3 holding that it is a violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") for states to discriminate
against people with disabilities by confining them to institutions when
such individuals could live more appropriately in a community-based
setting.4 Yet, nearly eight years after the Olmstead decision and
fourteen years after the passage of the ADA, progress in implementing
the Olmstead integration mandate remains disappointingly slow. While

1. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
2. Jefferson D.E. Smith & Steve P. Calandrillo, Forward to FundamentalAlteration:
Addressing ADA Title 11 IntegrationLawsuits After Olmstead v. L.C., 24 HARV.J.L. & PUB.
POLVY 695, 698 (2001).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
4. 527 U.S. at 607.
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individuals with disabilities and advocates hailed the landmark ruling,
large numbers of individuals remain unnecessarily institutionalized
despite the Olmstead integration mandate. 5
This Comment has five primary objectives. First, this Comment
makes a case for deinstitutionalization and explains some of the benefits
of community life and integration. Second, this Comment outlines the
history of segregation and gives an overview of the incremental
movement toward community care, culminating with the ADA and the
Integration Regulation 6 in the post-1990's era. Third, this Comment
analyzes the Olmstead decision and its importance. Fourth, this
Comment discusses some of the barriers affecting the states' implementation and transition to community integration, followed by a discussion
of the federal government's efforts to assist the states in complying with
the Olmstead mandate. Fifth, this Comment explains why community
integration can be more beneficial today and easier than ever in a call
to genuinely awaken the nation's conscience.
II.

THE CASE FOR DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION

Institutionalization is the most extreme form of segregation.
Institutionalized individuals suffer a dramatic loss of physical freedom
with severely invasive treatment. They cannot enjoy the simple, daily
pleasures that the average American takes for granted, such as
shopping, working, exercising, companionship, making their own
Citizens who do enjoy these freedoms of
schedules, or solitude.'
American society would undeniably find the loss of such things "not only
intolerable but a threat to [their] very sanity."8
Institutionalized individuals are deprived of commonplace, yet
precious, liberties such as inclusion, dignity, self-direction, privacy,
choice, enjoyment of the responsibilities of citizenship, and participation
in and contribution to one's community. More accurately, individuals in
institutions experience dependency, physical segregation, social isolation,
and second-class citizenship. In the worst-case scenarios, individuals in
institutions suffer physical, mental, and emotional abuse and neglect.
Even for those who do not suffer egregious neglect or abuse, life in an
institution nonetheless leads to a certain degree of institutional

5. Jennifer Mathis, Where Are We Five Years After Olmstead?, CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
J. OF POVERTY LAW & POL'Y 561, 561 (Jan.-Feb. 2005).
6. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2006).
7. Joanne Karger, "Don'tTread on the ADA": Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring and the
Future of Community Integrationfor Individuals with MentalDisabilities,40 B.C. L. REV.
1221, 1221 (1999).
8. Id.
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dependence. This dependence manifests itself in a loss of social and
intellectual competencies and atrophy of the ability to live outside the
institution. 9
Just a glimpse at the immediate aftermath of the Olmstead ruling
proves there are individuals in institutions who need not be there and
have much to offer society beyond the walls of an institution. The lives
of the two Olmstead plaintiffs, Ms. Curtis and Ms. Wilson, illustrate the
benefit and magnitude of the decision and show the positive effect the
decision can have on individuals as well as society as a whole. Ms.
Curtis and Ms. Wilson progressed rapidly once they were moved to
community-based settings. Their rapid advancements revealed the
limitations of their former institutional circumstances. Ms. Curtis takes
long walks and has reconnected with her mother and sister. She visits
the mall, picks out her own clothes, and has learned to plan a menu.
Additionally, she speaks clearly, communicates well, and has developed
meaningful friendships with others that live with her in a group home.
With practical assistance and encouragement from her customized
support team, Ms. Curtis has started to produce and sell note cards that
illustrate her own artwork.1 °
Ms. Wilson spent a year in a group home where she decorated her own
room and organized picture albums. She then transitioned into a home
where she lived with a caretaker and a friend. Ms. Wilson attended a
prevocational program and became increasingly independent. Interestingly, she took complete responsibility for her own medical needs, which
was one domain in which institutional doctors felt she could not succeed
independently. Moreover, she developed her own advocacy skills by
speaking around the country about her experiences, the injustices of
institutional life, and her hopes for the freedom of other individuals in
institutions.1
Indeed, the magnitude of the societal effect of Olmstead is undeniable
because disability is an experience that will touch most Americans to
some degree in their lives. Today, over fifty-four million Americans, or
one in every five, are living with a disability. 2 People with disabilities
make up the nation's largest minority and the only minority that any
person can join at any time.
Individuals with disabilities cross all

9. Smith & Calandrillo, supra note 2, at 703-04.
10. Atlanta Legal Aid Society, http://www.atlantalegalaid.orglimpact.htm (last visited
Apr. 12, 2007).
11. Id.
12. United States Department of Labor Office of Disability Employment Policy,
www.dol.gov/odep/pubs/ek96/diverse.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
13. Id.
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gender, racial, religious, educational, and socioeconomic lines. 4 Some
individuals are born with disabilities, some may become disabled
through an accident or illness, and many will face disability through the
aging process. These astonishing statistics raise the moral question of
whether or not we are our brother's and sister's keeper? The answer
should be a resounding "yes"!
Although the Olmstead decision has become known as the integration
mandate, there remain many post-Olmstead implementation issues
which need to be actively addressed. There is no question that the longterm costs of home and community-based care are less than that of
institutional care. Further, community care is not merely a financially
superior option, but a morally and legally superior one as well. Yet, in
the aggregate, our nation has made little progress toward the goal of
transitioning from institutions to community integration. Why is this
situation so immutable and what is holding the states back? Or more
importantly, what are the states waiting for to take substantial action?

III.
A.

HISTORY OF DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND THE

ADA

The Incremental Movement Toward Community Care

The discriminatory treatment and segregation of persons with
disabilities has deep historical roots. Individuals with disabilities have
been segregated in institutions and isolated from mainstream society in
the United States for over one hundred years. 5 For over half of the
twentieth century, people with mental and developmental disabilities
were typically placed in large institutions, and some relied solely on
their families for care and financial aid. Little to no assistance was
available from the government. 6 Indeed, the majority of early cases
addressing people with disabilities evidenced eugenics measures to
control their reproduction and forced institutionalization. 7
During this time, medical professionals advanced the view that
individuals with disabilities were more likely to engage in criminal and
sexually immoral behavior, and thus, were a menace to society.'" This
stereotypical notion, coupled with the perceived danger that such
individuals posed, furthered the idea that they should be locked up and

14. Id.
15. Karger, supra note 7, at 1224.
16. Sandra L. Yue, A Return of InstitutionalizationDespite Olmstead v. L.C.? The
Inadequacy of MedicaidProviderReimbursement in Minnesota and the Failureto Deliver
Home- and Community-Based Waiver Services, 19 LAW & INEQ. 307, 312 (2001).
17. Id.; see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
18. Karger, supra note 7, at 1225.
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segregated from the rest of the community. 9 Consequently, institutions came to be viewed as the most effective solution, whereby
individuals with mental disabilities could be given the paternalistic
protection they were perceived to need, and society at large could be
safeguarded from their alleged vices. 0
1.
1950s-1970s: Civil Rights Era and the Rehabilitation
Act. Efforts to progress forward from institutions to community care
began to surface in the 1950s and continued with somewhat more force
in the 1960s and 1970s. 2" "Until the late 1960s, the dual attitudes of
paternalism and fear ensured a segregated, institutionalized existence
for people with disabilities." 22 A strengthening civil rights movement
empowered disability rights advocates to seek improved living conditions
and, more importantly, to retreat from unnecessary institutionalization
altogether. Further, sociological studies exposed the abuse and neglect
that was occurring in institutions and became a factor in the stimulus
for change. 3
An increased societal emphasis on personal autonomy and individual
rights, coupled with a strengthened agreement among experts that many
people with disabilities could benefit and thrive in less restrictive
settings, supported the deinstitutionalization movement. 24 By the early
1970s, courts were faced with many class action suits challenging poor
institutional conditions.2 5 These courts "consistently concluded that the
civil rights of individuals with mental retardation and other developmental disabilities were being violated." 26 The key legislative impetus
behind this movement was the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehab
27

Act").

Section 504 of the Rehab Act was the first broad civil rights-oriented
federal statute to address discrimination against people with physical
and mental disabilities." The Rehab Act prohibited federal programs
from excluding persons on the basis of disability and provided the
framework for vocational rehabilitation and independent living

19. See id.
20. Id.
21. Smith & Calandrillo, supra note 2, at 707.
22. Yue, supra note 16, at 313.
23. Karger, supra note 7, at 1226-27.
24. See Yue, supra note 16, at 313.
25. Id. at 314.
26. Id.
27. 29 U.S.C. Ch. 16 (2000).
28. Yue, supra note 16, at 314.
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programs.2 9 Nevertheless, circuit courts refused to find a right to the
least restrictive environment under the Rehab Act and consistently
denied that the Rehab Act required states to place people with disabilities in such an environment. 0 Thus, rights for persons with disabilities were recognized during the civil rights era, but more progress was
needed to reach the ideal of community integration for everyone.
2. 1980s: Increased Advocacy Based on Empirical Studies. In
the 1980s, empirical studies proved that community placements provided
a better quality of life and were financially superior from a long-term
perspective. Despite this research, in 1981 the Supreme Court refused
to find an articulated right to treatment in the least restrictive
environment under the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill
of Rights Act ("DDA Act") in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
31
Halderman.
The DDA Act established a voluntary federal-state grant
program whereby the federal government provided financial assistance
to participating states to help create programs to care for persons with
developmental disabilities. 2 Specifically, the "Bill of Rights" provision
of the DDA Act states that individuals with developmental disabilities
have a right to "appropriate treatment" in "the setting that is least
restrictive of ...personal liberty."3 3
In Pennhurst the plaintiff was a resident of the Pennhurst State
School and Hospital ("Pennhurst"). The plaintiff filed suit on behalf of
herself and all other residents alleging that the conditions at Pennhurst
were unsanitary, inhumane, and dangerous. Specifically, she alleged
that such conditions violated the class members' due process and equal
protection rights and additionally constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. The complaint urged that Pennhurst be closed and that
community living arrangements be established for its current residents.34

29. See 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2000).
30. See, e.g., P.C. v. McGlaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1041 (2d Cir. 1990); Phillips v.
Thompson, 715 F.2d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the state did not have an
affirmative duty under the Rehab Act to create less restrictive community residential
settings for persons with disabilities).
31. 451 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1981).
32. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), repealed by Developmental
Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-402, 114 Stat. 1677
(2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15001-15115 (2000)).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 6009(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), repealed by Developmental
Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-402, 114 Stat. 1677
(2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 15009(1)(2) (2000)).
34. Pennhurst,451 U.S. at 6.
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The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania made
factual findings that the conditions at Pennhurst were dangerous and
that residents were often physically abused by staff members. The
district court also found that the conditions were inadequate for any
possible habilitation of its residents because the physical, intellectual,
and emotional skills of some residents had in fact deteriorated while at
Pennhurst. The district court held that persons with mental disabilities
have a constitutional right to be provided with minimally adequate
habilitation in the least restrictive environment. Accordingly, the court
ordered that Pennhurst be closed and that community living arrangements be provided for all of its current residents.3 5
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order
but rested its opinion on a construction of the DDA Act instead of the
plaintiff's constitutional claims.36 Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court
reversed and held that the DDA Act did not create any substantive right
to treatment in the least restrictive environment.3 7 The Court reasoned
that it had to look beyond the explicit language of the DDA Act and
instead "'look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and
policy."'' s Further, the Court reasoned that an analysis of the "Bill of
Rights" provision in the context of other specific provisions reveals that
it merely represents a congressional preference for community-based
3 9
treatment but does not require states to provide such treatment.
Thus, the Court held that despite the language of the statute, individuals with disabilities did not have a right under the DDA Act to receive
community-based treatment.4 ° As a result, Pennhurst became the
seminal case used by states in their arguments against deinstitutionalization.4 '
Nonetheless, the movement for community care and inclusion was
gaining momentum. Community-care advocates urged that such care
was superior to institutions in terms of quality, cost, and equity.
Evidence of abuse, neglect, and unsanitary conditions in large institutions was well documented. Empirical studies were conducted in the
1980s to evaluate the costs of community care compared to institutional
care. 42 Individuals with mental disabilities were randomly placed in

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 18.
Karger, supra note 7, at 1238.
See Smith & Calandrillo, supra note 2, at 703-04.
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either an institutional or a residential setting. The studies revealed that
alternative care is generally more effective and less costly than
institutional care.43 Further evidence documented that the cost-perpatient in community care is lower than the cost-per-patient in
institutional settings."
Large overhead expenses contribute to the high cost of institutional
care. Advocates argue that overhead costs are high because institutions
must recreate the services which, in reality, are components of everyday
life. In contrast, community-based programs do not have to be
constructed and thus cost much less to provide. Moreover, many
individuals placed in community-based settings will be able to secure
employment and develop personal relationships from which they can
receive support. Therefore, these individuals will be less dependent on
the state for future financial support.45
Community-care advocates contend that cost concerns are merely a
facade and the true underlying issue behind the inertia to provide
community-based living is unwillingness and ignorance on the part of
institution administrators. Activists assert that administrators and
officials are hesitant to move patients out of institutions because of their
desire to maintain a high occupancy rate and their reluctance to
terminate large numbers of institution employees.46
Significantly more relevant than the issue of costs is the contention
that community care allows for greater social equality and better overall
quality of life for individuals with disabilities. Confined living often
leads to great institutional dependence, which manifests in a loss of
social, vocational, and relational competencies. 47 Strong evidence
confirms that individuals with disabilities living in community-based
settings "spend more time with friends and social groups, have a higher
level of self-esteem, show fewer symptoms, and comply more consistently
with medication and treatment plans."48
B.

The ADA and the Post-1990s Era
In 1990 Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), 49 which was by far the most comprehensive legislation geared
toward the prohibition of discrimination based on disability. When

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
42

at 704.
at 704-06.
at 705.
at 704.
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
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enacting the ADA, Congress noted "the Nation's proper goals regarding
individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such
individuals." ° The ADA built upon the foundations laid by the Rehab
Act to further bolster support for the disability rights movement. In
signing the ADA into law, President George H. W. Bush gave his praises
to the effort by stating: "The Americans with Disabilities Act presents
us all with an historic opportunity. It signals the end to the unjustified
segregation and exclusion of persons with disabilities from the mainstream of American life.""' Moreover, former Attorney General Dick
Thornburgh lauded the ADA as "a great leap forward in the civil rights
movement."52
Significantly, the ADA is the first statute to explicitly identify
"institutionalization" as a serious issue of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities. In the general provisions of the ADA,
Congress expressly found the following:
[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals
with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a
serious and pervasive social problem;...
[d]iscrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such
critical areas as . .. housing, public accommodations, education, ...
[and] institutionalization...; ....
[i]ndividuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of
discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion,... overprotective rules and policies,. . . [and] segregation ....
Specific to the institution context and the purpose of this article, Title
II of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in the
provision of public services.54
Title II specifies that "no qualified individual with a disability shall,
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."55 Title II
of the ADA omits the term "otherwise" preceding the phrase "qualified

50. Id. § 12101(a)(8)..
51. Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1070, 1071 (July 26, 1990).

52. Dick Thornburgh, The Americans with Disabilities Act: What it Means to All
Americans, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 375, 375 (1991).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (3), (5).
54. See generally id. §§ 12131-12165 (2000).
55. Id. § 12132.
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individual with a disability;" the term was problematic in section 504 of
the Rehab Act because it required plaintiffs to establish the prima facie
element that they were "otherwise qualified." 56 This omission makes
the language of the ADA broader and less restrictive than that of section
504 of the Rehab Act.57 Congress instructed the Attorney General to
issue regulations implementing Title II's prohibition of discrimination. 5
In so doing, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") regulations require a
public entity to "make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination
on the basis of disability . . . . 9 However, a public entity can avoid
making changes to its programs if it can show the modifications "would
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity."0
The DOJ's "integration regulation" requires a public entity to
"administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated
setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities."61 Notably, the preamble to the regulations clarifies that "the
most integrated setting appropriate" is "a setting that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with nondisabled persons to the fullest
extent possible."62 "Clearly, in using this specific language concerning
nondisabled persons with whom people with disabilities should be able
to interact, the Attorney General did not have in mind limiting the
interaction to" orderlies or nurses in an institution. 63 Thus, it appears
that in enacting the ADA and its regulations, Congress and the DOJ
were aware of and considered the precise issues of institutionalization
and integration.
Yet, "[e]ven early efforts under the ADA and the Integration Regulation met checkered results."64 In 1993 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts refused to hold that the ADA required states to provide
specific levels of community care, and thus denied relief to a class of
patients with mental disabilities. 5 Also in 1993 two federal district

56. Karger, supra note 7, at 1239.
57. Id.
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a).
59. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2006).
60. Id.
61. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2006).
62. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, subpart B, § 35.130 (2006).
63. Andrew I. Batavia, A Right to Personal Assistance Services: "Most Integrated
Setting Appropriate"Requirements and the Independent Living Model of Long-Term Care,
27 AM. J.L. & MED. 17, 31 (2001).
64. Smith & Calandrillo, supra note 2, at 708.
65. See Williams v. Sec'y of Executive Office of Human Servs., 609 N.E.2d 447,452-53
(Mass. 1993).
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courts split on the issue of whether the ADA required unnecessarily
institutionalized individuals to be placed in the least restrictive
environment."6
In addition to a lack of clarity as to what the Integration Regulation
required, there was much uncertainty as to what constituted a fundamental alteration as opposed to a reasonable accommodation. This
uncertainty has persisted, to some extent, even after the Olmstead
decision. In practice, these provisions have led some courts to consider
the costs to states in determining whether a community-based setting is
6 7
required for an individual with a disability.
Helen L. v. DiDario,s
a key case decided by the Third Circuit prior to Olmstead, addressed this
issue of costs and somewhat solidified the applicability of the Integration
Regulation. 9
In Helen L., the plaintiff was a forty-three year old woman who
contracted meningitis, which left her paralyzed from the waist down and
confined to a wheelchair. As a result, she became a patient of the
Philadelphia Nursing Home. Although the plaintiff was able to dress
herself, cook, and tend to most of her personal hygiene needs, she did
need assistance with certain activities including laundry, shopping,
house cleaning, and getting in and out of bed. The health professionals
determined that the plaintiff was eligible for home-based care. However,
due to a lack of funding, she was placed on a waiting list for the
attendant care program and continued to live in the nursing home where
she had no contact with nondisabled persons other than the nursing
home staff.7 °
The plaintiff filed suit, alleging that the Department of Public Welfare
had violated Title II of the ADA by providing her services in a nursing
home rather than in the "'most integrated setting appropriate'" to her
needs.7 1 The lower court granted summary judgment for the Department of Public Welfare, holding that it had not discriminated against
her on the basis of disability because it wait-listed her due to lack of
funding.72 However, the Third Circuit rejected this reasoning and
rejected the State's "fundamental alteration" defense.7" The court held
that a denial of services in the most integrated setting appropriate

66. See Conner v. Branstad, 839 F. Supp. 1346, 1357 (S.D. Iowa 1993); Martin v.
Voinovich, 840 F. Supp. 1175, 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
67. Batavia, supra note 63, at 32.
68. 46 F.3d 325 (3d.Cir. 1995).
69. See id. at 327.
70. Id. at 328-29.
71. Id. at 328.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 335-39.
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violated the ADA, despite a lack of funding.7 4 The United States
Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari.75
The court reasoned that fiscal or administrative convenience was not
76
a valid justification for providing services in a segregated manner.
Furthermore, the court determined that placing the plaintiff in
attendant care would actually save the state an average of $34,500 per
year.77 Thus, by requiring the Department of Public Welfare to provide
home care for the plaintiff, the court was in no way imposing a large
expense on the State of Pennsylvania.78 In making this decision, the.
court relied heavily on Congress's statement that "'[tihe Nation's proper
goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of
opportunity, full participation, [I independent living,'" and economic selfsufficiency for such individuals. 79 Also, the court referred to the DOJ's
statement that "'[i]ntegration is fundamental to the purposes of the
Americans with Disabilities Act.'"' s
Therefore, prior to Olmstead, the Third Circuit affirmed that the ADA
81
mandated the maximum possible integration into the community.
This opinion has been interpreted to disallow cost considerations when
analyzing whether an individual should be placed in a community
setting. 2 Notably, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
Olmstead relied on the reasoning of Helen L."3 However, by 1999 the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and was ready to
consider the issue in Olmstead.
IV. THE OLMSTEAD DECISION
In 1999, in Olmstead v. L.C., 84 the United States Supreme Court held
that the unjustified segregation of individuals with mental disabilities
in institutions constitutes discrimination under the ADA.88 Additionally, the Court held that the ADA requires states to provide placement for
individuals with mental disabilities in community settings rather than
in institutions when: (1) the state's treatment professionals determine

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 338.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8)).
Id. at 332 (quoting 28 C.F.R. Part 35, App. A § 35.130 (2006)).
See id. at 327.
Batavia, supra note 63, at 32.
46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995).
527 U.S. 581 (1999).
Id. at 607; 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
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that such placement is appropriate; (2) the affected individual does not
oppose the placement; and (3) the state can reasonably accommodate the
placement without creating a fundamental alteration, given the state's
available resources and the needs of other individuals with mental
disabilities.8 6
A.

Factual Background

The plaintiffs, Lois Curtis and Elaine Wilson, were Georgia residents
who had cognitive disabilities. In addition, Ms. Curtis suffered from
schizophrenia, and Ms. Wilson was diagnosed with a personality
disorder. Previously, both women had been treated in institutional
settings and were Medicaid beneficiaries. In May 1992 Ms. Curtis was
voluntarily admitted to the psychiatric unit of Georgia Regional Hospital
("GRH") where her condition was stabilized by May 1993. Accordingly,
her treatment team determined her needs could be sufficiently met in a
state supported community-based program. Despite this evaluation, Ms.
Curtis remained institutionalized for nearly three more years. Ms.
Wilson was also voluntarily admitted to the psychiatric unit of GRH in
February 1995. By 1996 Ms. Wilson's psychiatrist determined that she
could be treated appropriately in a community-based setting, but she
remained institutionalized until late 1997.87
In May 1995 Ms. Curtis filed suit against the Georgia Department of
Human Resources (then led by Commissioner Tommy Olmstead) in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Ms.
Curtis challenged her continued institutional confinement and alleged
that the State's failure to transfer her to a community-based setting,
after her doctors found such placement to be appropriate, violated Title
II of the ADA. She sought placement in a community residential
program and treatment that would integrate her into mainstream
society. Ms. Wilson intervened in the action. 8
B.

Lower Court Decisions

The district court granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs
and ordered their placement in a community-based treatment program.
The State unsuccessfully argued that inadequate funding, rather than
discrimination, was the reason the plaintiffs remained at GRH. The
court rejected this argument and concluded that unnecessary institution-

86. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607.
87. Id. at 593.
88. Id. at 593-94.
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al segregation constitutes per se discrimination under Title II and could
not be justified by a lack of funding.8 9
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, but did
not conclusively order community care for the plaintiffs. Instead, the
court remanded for a reassessment of the State's cost-based defense.
The Eleventh Circuit interpreted the statute and regulations to allow for
such a defense in very limited circumstances. Thus, the court of appeals
remanded with instructions for the district court to determine whether
the additional treatment costs of the women in community-based
settings would be unreasonable in light of the demands on the State's
mental health budget and would fundamentally alter the State's mental
health program.90 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
because "of the importance of the question presented to the States and
affected individuals," and affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
substantial part.91
C.

Supreme Court's Rationale

In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that unjustified segregation
constitutes "discrimination based on disability."92 Justice Ginsburg,
writing for the majority, phrased the issue before the Court as "whether
the proscription of discrimination [in Title II] may require placement of
persons with mental disabilities in community settings rather than in
institutions." 3 The Court held the answer to be a "qualified yes."94
Initially, the Court pointed out the "legislative and regulatory prescriptions on which the case turn[ed]."95 In so doing, the Court emphasized
the Title II regulation, known as the "Integration Regulation," which
reads as follows: "'A public entity shall administer services, programs,
and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of
qualified individuals with disabilities.' 96 Further, the Court noted the
preamble to the Attorney General's Title II regulations which defines
"'the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified
individuals with disabilities'" to be "'a setting that enables individuals

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Id.
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with disabilities to interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest
extent possible.'"9 7
Relying on these provisions, the Court held that unjustified placement
or retention of persons in institutions is discrimination based on
disability.9" The Court reasoned that the ADA extended the scope and
strengthened earlier attempts, such as the Rehab Act 99 and the DDA
Act, 100 to secure opportunities for people with disabilities to enjoy the
benefits of community living.'' Through the ADA, Congress secured
these opportunities not only by prohibiting discrimination by all public
segregaentities, but additionally by specifically identifying unjustified
02
tion of persons with disabilities as a type of discrimination.
The Court noted two important premises that supported the contention
that unjustified isolation is a form of discrimination. First, institutional
placement of persons who can thrive in and "benefit from community
settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated
are incapable or unworthy of participating in" the community.0 3
Second, institutional isolation "severely diminishes the everyday life
activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work
options, economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural
enrichment."0 4 Accordingly, dissimilar treatment exists for such
individuals because "[iun order to receive needed medical services,
persons with mental disabilities must, because of those disabilities,
relinquish participation in community life they could enjoy given
reasonable accommodations, while persons without mental disabilities
can receive the medical services they need without similar sacrifice."0 5
However, the Court cautioned that its ruling does not mean that
people who are unable to cope with or benefit from community living
should be removed from the institutions, nor does it mean that
community-based treatment may be imposed on those who do not desire
it. 10 6 Thus, the state may rely on the reasonable assessments of its

own professionals to determine whether an individual meets 10 the
7
eligibility requirements for removal to a community-based setting.

97. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, subpart B, § 35.130 (2006)).
98. Id. at 597.
99. 9 U.S.C. ch. 16 (2000).
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 15001-15115 (2000).
101. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 599.
102. Id. at 600 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(2), 12101(a)(5)).
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Nonetheless, the Court cautioned that once the State provides
community-based treatment to qualified persons, its responsibilities are
not "boundless.""8 The State must make reasonable modifications, but
the State is not required to make modifications that would create a
fundamental alteration of the States' services and programs.' 9 The
Eleventh Circuit interpreted this regulation to permit a cost-based
defense in limited circumstances." 0 However, the Supreme Court
rejected this simple cost comparison as inappropriate because "it would
leave the State virtually defenseless once it is shown that the plaintiff
is qualified for the service or program she seeks.""' Additionally, the
Court pointed out that the DOJ regulation's interpretation of the term
"fundamental alteration" must be consistent with the DOJ regulations
for § 504 of the Rehab Act, which included a similar defense pertaining
to "undue hardship."" 2 The Court noted the regulations for section
504 define "undue hardship" to mean more than mere cost; rather, the
concept involves a case-by-case analysis3 of additional factors such as the
overall type and size of the program.1
Under the proper construction of the fundamental alteration defense,
the State must show that immediate relief for the plaintiffs would be
inequitable in light of available resources and the State's responsibility
to care for a large and diverse population of other persons with
disabilities as well as the State's responsibility to provide services in an
equitable manner." 4 The Court found that future courts must consider these additional factors in light of a state's available resources."'
Thus, in order for the State to maintain its mental health facilities and
render services effectively, it needed more leeway than the Eleventh.
Circuit found the fundamental alteration defense to allow." 6
The Court gave direction to the states on implementation of this
mandate by way of example. For illustration, the reasonable modifications standard would be met if the State could show it had a comprehensive and effective plan for placing qualified persons in less restrictive
settings, and "a waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace" that was
not controlled by the State's efforts to keep its institutions at full

108.
109.

Id. at 603.
Id.

110. Id.
111. Id.
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capacity."7
Moreover, individuals could not receive community
placement ahead of others on the waiting list merely by filing a
lawsuit.118
For these reasons, the Court held that states are required to provide
community-based treatment for persons with mental disabilities when:
(1) treatment professionals find that such placement is appropriate; (2)
the person with disabilities does not oppose community-based treatment;
and (3) the placement can be reasonably accommodated in light of the
state's available resources and the needs of others with mental
disabilities." 9 Thus, the Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit in part,
vacated in part, and remanded the case for an examination of many
factors beyond a simple cost comparison to determine if the community
placement
represented a fundamental alteration of Georgia's pro120
gram.
V.

WHY THE SUPREME COURT INTERVENED

The Supreme Court's ruling in Olmstead12'-that the ADA 22 and
the Integration Regulation 23 prohibit discrimination against unnecessarily institutionalized individuals-illustrated the Court's concern for,
and recognition of, the need for federal intervention in the institutional
arena. Thus, the Court recognized the need for federal involvement in
an area where state legislatures were not well-suited to correct the
problem. Additionally, individuals with mental disabilities, as a group,
are less capable of representing their interests in monolithic power
centers. 124 These individuals "vote less frequently, donate less money,
and lobby less loudly." 125 Moreover, evidence indicated that state
institutions often were not providing adequate care, and the states
continued to allow this substandard existence despite the data proving
community care was less expensive and more effective. 12 "This reality
provides a measure of empirical evidence that states were not sufficiently equipped, or perhaps not sufficiently motivated, to resolve the
problems facing the unnecessarily institutionalized ... population." 27

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 605-06.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 607.
Id.
527 U.S. 581 (1999).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2006).
Smith & Calandrillo, supra note 2, at 715.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Therefore, the need for federal intervention was an additional concern
that weighed in favor of the Court's conclusion in Olmstead.
VI.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE OLMSTEAD DECISION

The Olmstead'2 8 decision places an important obligation on states as
they seek to comply with Title II of the ADA.129 The Olmstead decision did not merely hold that unjustified institutionalization amounts to
discrimination under the ADA. More importantly, Olmstead established
that states have a legal obligation to affirmatively remedy such
discriminatory practices through reasonable modifications to their
programs and services. This obligation is often referred to as the
"integration mandate."13 ° Title II of the ADA applies to public entities
and to the use of public funds. 131 Thus, the Olmstead decision has
grave implications for publicly funded Medicaid services which treat and
care for people with disabilities. The decision confirmed that states
must ensure that Medicaid-eligible persons do not experience discrimination by being institutionalized 132
when they could be better served in an
integrated community setting.
However, courts, commentators, and practitioners find the Olmstead
decision both "profound and ambiguous."1 33 While the decision did
establish broad safeguards for individuals with disabilities, it also raised
many questions regarding how the integration mandate should be
implemented.3
The Court made limited recommendations as to the
nature of state compliance with the ADA in light of Olmstead. The
Court illustrated that states may comply by creating a comprehensive
and effectively-working plan to reduce institutionalization and by
ensuring that the waiting lists for services move at a reasonable
135
pace.
Federal officials, state officials, and advocates seized upon this
language as the heart of the remedial portion of the opinion.13 6 An
"'effectively working state plan"' for community placement and waiting

128. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
129. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
130. Center for Personal Assistance Services, Home and Community-Based Services:
Introduction to Olmstead Lawsuits and Olmstead Plans(Oct. 2006), http://pascenter.org/olmstead/.
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
132. Center for Personal Assistance Services, supra note 130.
133. Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the
Uninsured, Olmstead at Five: Assessing the Impact 1 (June 2004), www.kff.org.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 6.
136. Id.
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lists that move at a "'reasonable pace"' became "fundamental jumping-off
points for implementation."1 3 7 Yet, the decision did not offer clarity on
such matters as when changes in Medicaid and other programs cross the
line from reasonable modification to fundamental alteration, when a
waiting list is moving at a reasonable pace, or what constitutes an
effectively working plan. 3 8
Further, measuring the progress of
Olmstead implementation is problematic because "there are no clearly
3
stated objectives, budgets, or timetables.""
'
In fact, an emerging
theme from post-Olmstead cases is judicial encouragement of policy
change, but minimal desire to actually enforce the change process.'4 °
Lower courts have generally decided that evidence of states' active
commitment, yet slow progress towards community integration, satisfies
the ADA.'
Commentators criticize these decisions as Irlewarding
rather than sanctioning states that move slowly toward change."'4 2
The current issue for most states today, including Georgia, is how to
implement and complete the transition from institutions to a system of
home- and community-based services. 43
Institutionalization of
individuals with disabilities has been generally declining since the
1960s. Since 1991 eight states and the District of Columbia have closed
all of their institutions, and most states have closed at least one
institution.'" Unfortunately, this slow but positive trend has decreased in recent years. Surprisingly, the lowest rate of deinstitutionalization in thirty years occurred in the period between 2001 and 2003,
which was after the Supreme Court issued the Olmstead mandate.'4 5
A study conducted by the National Conference of State Legislatures
in January 2003 revealed that twenty-one states had issued Olmstead
plans or reports, and at least twelve other states planned to issue them
during 2003.146 In 2006 a study revealed that thirty states had issued

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Randy Desonia, National Health Policy Forum, Is Community Care a Civil Right?
The Unfolding Saga of the Olmstead Decision .17 (Mar. 12, 2003), http://www.nhpf.org
(search "unfolding saga").
140. Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 133, at 9.
141. Center for Personal Assistance Services, supra note 130.
142. See Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 133, at 9.
143. See Georgia's Developmental Disabilities Council, Understandingthe Challenges
and Options of TransitioningPeople with Developmental Disabilitiesfrom Institutions to
Community Living 1, http://www.gcdd.org/publicpolicy/index.htm (follow "Deinstitutionalization-Challenges and Options").
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. Wendy Fox-George, Donna Folkemer & Jordan Lewis, The States'Response to the
Olmstead Decision: How are States Complying?, National Conference of State Legislatures,
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Olmstead plans, fourteen states had developed alternative responses to
Olmstead, and eight states have neither an Olmstead plan nor an
alternative response to the Olmstead mandate.'47 Thus, incremental
change has altered the landscape since the Olmstead decision in
important, yet subtle, ways.
VII.

BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION

In the eight years since the Olmstead'" mandate, states' responses
have fallen short of advocates' expectations. On the five-year anniversary of Olmstead, the director of the Bazelon Center for Mental Health
Law criticized that "'[m]ost states are enacting ... reforms at a snail's
pace, defying the spirit of the ruling and preventing Americans with
mental illnesses from participating in their communities.'"149 The
director stated that "'[r]hetoric has far outstripped action to promote
community services for people with mental illnesses. States are quick
to trumpet their limited efforts to implement Olmstead, but these have
produced little actual movement of people.., into integrated community
settings.'"8I'
Furthermore, advocates contend that any real progress
that has occurred is largely because states have been sued."8 ' Advocates opine it is "'past time for Olmstead implementation
to move out of
15 2
the courtroom and into America's communities.'"
A major problem is that numerous barriers exist in implementing
aggressive Olmstead plans, including: financial constraints on Medicaid
and state budget cuts; lack of affordable and accessible housing; labor
shortage and disincentive of home care workers; inertia; and political
pressure of institutional care facilities.'
Thus, the overhaul and
transition to community-based services is undoubtedly a considerable
undertaking. Nevertheless, these barriers and challenges will continue
to inhibit the transition to community care if the states fail to embrace
the opportunity Olmstead provided for positive change.

http'//www.ncsl.org/programs/health/forum/olmsreport.htm. (follow "Findings").
147. Center for Personal Assistance Services, supra note 130.
148. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
149. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Legal Advocate Cites OngoingSegregation
on Eve of Olmstead Anniversary (June 2004), httpJ/www.bazelon.org/newsroom/archive/
2004/6-21-04olmstead.htm.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Center for Personal Assistance Services, supra note 130.
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A.

Shortage of QUalified Community-Care Workers
The quality of care individuals with disabilities receive is closely
related to crucial aspects of job enrichment for the workers providing the
care. 164 Often, the front-line workers earn low wages and receive few
benefits. These inadequacies and disincentives result in high rates of
turnover, job dissatisfaction, and difficulty with recruiting qualified
workers in community-based programs.' 55 These issues directly affect
the deinstitutionalization effort and the continuity of care for those being
served. Private providers of services are better able to adjust wages to
attract employees. Public providers who are funded by public dollars are
not as readily able to address the issue.'6 Public providers of direct
support services for people with disabilities are paid by the state
according to fixed reimbursement rates that may lag behind current
wage conditions in other sectors. 5
Furthermore, benefits are also less than adequate in the direct support
profession. Nationally, one in four of these direct care workers do not
have health insurance, which is fifty percent higher than in the general
population under age sixty-five.' 5 Consequently, despite the necessity
of their work, direct support workers do not receive adequate salaries to
support their families and receive fewer benefits than other comparable
professions. This creates a transition barrier to community-based care
because as institutions close, former residents need competent, welltrained support staff to serve them in the community.159 Unfortunate-

ly, states currently provide little incentive for anyone to work in this
vital capacity. Therefore, there is an overall shortage of qualified and
experienced staff.
B.

FinancialBarriers
It is well known and acknowledged that serving individuals in the
community is more. cost-effective than serving the same individuals in
an institution.' 6° Paradoxically, financing is one of the biggest barriers
to implementation of Olmstead plans. Funding for state initiatives is
meager largely due to on going state budget woes.'
In addition, the

154. Georgia's Developmental Disabilities Council, supra note 143, at 2.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 3.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 3-4.
161. Mathis, supra note 5, at 562.
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financial arrangements that govern Medicaid payments remain
institutionally biased. Until 1981 Medicaid provided assistance for longterm care only if the individual lived in an institution." 2 In 1981
Congress attempted to change the "institutional bias" of Medicaid by
creating the Home and Community Based Services ("HCBS") Waiver
Program"s for the treatment of individuals with disabilities in the
community.'6 This "waiver" allows the state to utilize a portion of its
Medicaid funds, which would have been for institutional use, to provide
community-based services instead.1 65
In order to obtain waivers, states apply for a limited number of waiver
slots and guarantee that the cost of the community-based services will
not exceed that of institutional care. The waiver program is optional
and up to the state's discretion as to the number of individuals with
disabilities that will receive home- and community-based services. 6 '
There is currently a wide disparity among the states with respect to the
amount of funds used for community-based services and programming.
In addition, some states, including Georgia, have not used all of the
waiver slots for which they applied. Those states that provide only
limited community-based services have long lists of individuals waiting
to receive services in the community.'67 Nationally, Medicaid program
growth shows that institutions are still the primary vehicle for
delivering long-term care." Consequently, the HCBS Waiver Program
has not succeeded in eradicating the institutional bias of the Medicaid
system.
Moreover, when individuals with developmental disabilities move from
an institution into the community, federal law allows them to take with
them the dollars used for their care in the institution. Thus, the "money
follows the person" through the transition.'69 In contrast, individuals
who have been institutionalized for mental health reasons cannot bring
the funds with them when an institution closes. Additionally, state
budget procedures often do not sustain the concept
of ensuring that the
170
money follows the person into the community.

162. Karger, supra note 7, at 1229.
163. Social Security Act tit. XIX, § 1915(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000).
164. Karger, supra note 7, at 1229.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 1229-30.
167. Id. at 1230.
168. Cynthia Shirk, National Health Policy Forum, Rebalancing Long-Term Care: The
Role of Medicaid HCBS Waiver Program 11 (Mar. 3, 2006), http://www.nhpf.org (search
"rebalancing long-term care").
169.
170.

Georgia's Developmental Disabilities Council, supra note 143, at 4.
Shirk, supra note 168, at 18.
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A closer look at Georgia's current situation further illustrates this
institutional bias. Georgia ranks lowest in the nation for the number of
persons with disabilities living in small community residential settings
per 100,000 in the population.17 ' In Georgia, the state pays approximately forty percent of the waiver population costs directly from its
budget. Then Georgia reports the number of individuals living in
institutions to the federal government, which assists the state by giving
it sixty percent of the costs of caring for them. However, the cost of
institutional care, unlike that of community-based services, is not
required to be a line-item budget expense. Rather, the funding of
institutional care can be amortized, which amounts to a much more
politically suitable financial arrangement. 172 As a result, the government's bias in favor of institutions is perpetuated.
Transitioning from institutional to home- and community-based care
in Georgia presents two main financial challenges. First, Georgia must
allocate funds to pay the forty percent state match of waiver costs for
those individuals living in the community, while the state is not held
accountable for its percentage of institutional costs.1 73 Second, when
an institution closes, the patients with mental illness or mental
disabilities must be wholly supported by the state. This transition
period requires Georgia to simultaneously finance both systems. While
this transitional phase is costly, the long-term total cost to support and
serve individuals with disabilities in community-based settings is less
expensive. Rather than view these temporary transitional costs as an
extra burden on the state's budget, lawmakers and citizens should
consider the expense from a long-term perspective. Currently, Georgia
still channels large amounts of money into costly institutions. Thus,
despite the cost-effectiveness of community care and the demonstrated
improved quality of life, the system' of payment remains institutionally
biased. 7 4 "This
bias serves as a powerful disincentive to a successful
75
transition."1
1. Inertia and Societal Attitude Barriers. Numerous barriers
and challenges exist to slow implemention of the Olmstead mandate.
While financial constraints and financial disincentives seem to be the
biggest obstacle for most states, there is also an inevitable inertia to
change, particularly a change of the magnitude Olmstead mandates.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
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However, as more individuals with disabilities become productive
members of society and societal attitudes as a whole change, hopefully
so too will the speed with which Olmstead initiatives are put into action.
What catalysts are necessary to inspire and awaken our nation's
conscience? Perhaps public awareness is the critical missing link.
Disability advocates, lobbyists, and legislators must better educate the
public to the fullest extent possible. A call to action from our nation's
citizens will be the impetus for increased state action. As citizens
become more informed of the lower costs of community care and the
long-term benefits to individuals with disabilities, there will be a public
outcry for change. The average American citizen is perhaps unaware of
the Supreme Court's ruling that affirmatively obligated states to place
individuals with disabilities in the least restrictive environment. More
importantly, most citizens are ignorant of the fact that implementation
of the mandate will save state funds while also benefiting society as a
whole.
It is important that all stakeholders, including families,
advocates, educators, and the public at large, gain a broader understanding of the potential impact of Olmstead and the benefits that can be
realized by everyone in -the process of deinstitutionalization and
community integration.
Clearly, there are some individuals with more challenging mental and
physical needs, including multiple medical complications, who would
require an intense support system to be able to live in the community.
These individuals may not be capable enough to completely function in
mainstream society. However, there is a greater number of individuals
living in institutions or other large group settings today who could
prosper, thrive, and even contribute as productive members of society
with minimal support. More importantly, there are individuals who can
learn and further develop their untapped potential or atrophied skills to
the point of thriving in the community with minimal personal support.
These citizens are the intended beneficiaries of the Olmstead integration
mandate, and these are the citizens who need the opportunity to enjoy
life in the least restrictive environment.
VIII.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS EFFORTS TO DELIVER ON THE
OLMSTEAD PROMISE

In response to Olmstead,"6 the Bush Administration launched the
New Freedom Initiative, a multiagency comprehensive plan aimed at
ensuring that all Americans have the opportunity to participate fully in

176.

527 U.S. 581 (1999).
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community life.177 As part of the New Freedom Initiative, on June 18,
2001, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13217,
"Community-Based Alternatives for Individuals with Disabilities."1 78
The Order reads in part:
[Ilt is hereby ordered as follows: ... The Federal Government must
assist States and localities to implement swiftly the Olmstead decision,
so as to help ensure that all Americans have the opportunity to live
close to their families and friends, to live more independently, to
engage
in productive employment, and to participate in community
179
life.
The Order further directs six federal agencies, including the Departments of Justice, Health and Human Services, Education, Labor,
Housing and Urban Development, and the Social Security Administration to "evaluate the policies, programs, statutes, and regulations ... to
determine whether any should be revised... to improve the availability
of community-based services for qualified individuals with disabilities."180
The United States Department of Health and Human Services
discusses the Order on the New Freedom Initiative section of its website
and refers to the President's Order as "Delivering on the Promise."'
The Order could be a milestone in the implementation of the ADA's' 8'
integration mandate because it recognizes the federal government has
a role to play in promoting community living, and represents the first
to act in concert to ensure
time federal agencies have been directed
8 3
compliance with Title II of the ADA.
The Order is also considered remarkable because it emphasizes public
input, and a federal-state partnership to achieve community living for
individuals with disabilities, a "groundbreaking" achievement.'
Thus, the Executive Order is significant because of what it requires
federal agencies to accomplish and because it affirms the Olmstead
mandate. However, the Order will be inconsequential unless the states
take their own aggressive action toward community integration.

177. Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 133, at 17.
178. Exec. Order No. 13,217, 66 Fed. Reg. 33,155 (June 18, 2001).
179. Id. at 33, 156.
180. Id.
181. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, New FreedomInitiativeDelivering
on the Promise: PreliminaryReport, http://www.hhs.gov/newfreedom/prelim/intro.html.
182. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
183. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, supra note 181.
184. Id.
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The Executive Order further directed the Attorney General and
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human services to "fully
enforce Title II of the ADA" by investigating and resolving individual
complaints of alleged discrimination and to work cooperatively with
states to resolve these complaints whenever possible.1 85 The public
input combined with the agencies' self-evaluation process revealed the
86
need for a variety of advancements to fully comply with Olmstead.
Some of these advancements include: greater federal oversight of
programs that serve individuals with disabilities; stronger enforcement
of laws that protect the rights of these individuals; more effective
technical assistance to aid states in appropriately serving individuals in
the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs; greater and more
effective outreach to assist individuals with disabilities and their
families in understanding the ADA and Olmstead's requirements.'87
Congress has also taken steps to provide funding for state integration
initiatives. In addition to HCBS Waiver Programs, recent federal
legislation has attempted to eliminate the institutional bias in funding
for community-based services. In 2000 Congress created Real Choice
Systems Change Grants for Community Life to help build the infrastructure and service options necessary for long-term community integration. 8' The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services has awarded
$240 million in Real Choice grants to states."8 9 Beginning in January
2007, a Money Follows the Person demonstration project 9 ° will provide
grants to seventeen approved states. The law appropriates $1.8 billion
over a five-year period for states to provide community services to
individuals who currently receive Medicaid in an institution.'9 ' The
federal government will pay the total costs of the community services for
one year. 192
In sum, the federal government's commitment to the New Freedom
Initiative was welcomed. However, it has also been criticized for not
moving quickly or aggressively enough toward implementation of the
Olmstead mandate. Specifically, the federal government's actions have
been criticized for lack of an overall national policy framework for
community integration and failure to adequately stimulate change in the
185. Exec. Order No. 13, 217, 66 Fed. Reg. at 33, 156.
186. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, New Freedom InitiativeDelivering
on the Promise:PreliminaryReport, http'J/www.hhs.gov/newfreedom/prelim/comply.html.
187. Id.
188. Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 133, at 17.
189. Shirk, supra note 168, at 7.
190. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171 § 6071, 120 Stat. 4, 102 (2006).
191. Shirk, supra note 168, at 21.
192. Georgia's Developmental Disabilities Council, supra note 143, at 7.
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long-term care system. 93 Conversely, the federal government did not
design these measures to create large-scale development of communitybased services and movement of institutional residents into integrated
settings. 9 4 Rather, these efforts were merely designed to assist states
in getting their planning efforts off the ground.'95
These federal
initiatives are vital and necessary steps; but, ultimately, a deep
commitment by the state is required to make community living a reality
for all citizens with disabilities. The limitations of state and federal
Olmstead implementation efforts have created a landscape in which
litigation has proven to be the most effective means of achieving
meaningful reform and progress for many people with disabilities. 96
The federal government has provided a substantive response to the
problem by attempting to restructure Medicaid so that money truly does
follow the person into the community as well as other federal grant
initiatives. The federal government has also given instructions to the
states regarding methods and procedures to implement the Olmstead
integration mandate. Yet, the states' response has been consistently
modest. In order for these initiatives to be effective, states must have
the will to utilize the resources offered by the federal government.
States must also make significant commitments to actively pursue full
community integration for their citizens with disabilities.
IX.

A

CALL TO GENUINELY AWAKEN THE NATION'S CONSCIENCE

The arena of disability law reform and recognition of rights for persons
with disabilities has strengthened significantly over the past seventeen
years. In 1990 the ADA'97 accelerated and enhanced the earlier efforts
of the Rehab Act.'
Then in 1999 the Supreme Court's landmark
Olmstead decision provided a call to state programs nationwide to
develop a system that promotes integration of people with disabilities
into the social mainstream with equal opportunities and independence
to make their own choices. 199 The Olmstead decision further enhanced
the power of the ADA and further defined states' obligations under the
ADA.2"' A great deal remains unknown about the scope and timeline
of Olmstead implementation, but it is evident that the decision has had

193. Center for Personal Assistance Services, supra note 130.
194. Mathis, supra note 5, at 562.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (2000).
198. 29 U.S.C. Ch.16 (2000).
199. See 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999).
200. See id.
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an impact on policymakers' understanding of the ADA and its strengthened protection for individuals with disabilities.
As the ten-year anniversary of the Olmstead decision rapidly
approaches, many question whether adequate efforts have been made to
implement the Supreme Court's mandate, and progress remains
unacceptably slow. No one, not even disability advocates, contended that
the transition would be easy or inexpensive. However, community
integration has been mandated for persons with disabilities and is the
change that will vastly improve their quality of life. In addition, care in
community-based settings has proven to be a more cost-effective longterm alternative to institutional care. The transition from institutionalization to community-based care is a process that requires a dedicated,
collaborative effort on the part of all stakeholders including states,
legislatures, institutions, providers, consumers, and families.
The Olmstead decision proposes a national vision of community life for
virtually everyone with few exceptions, regardless of disability. The
states are now obligated to achieve this result. It is time for our nation
to take action and move from a focus on intense regulations towards
ensuring basic human rights for all citizens, truly fulfilling the Olmstead
promise. Individuals need to be removed from segregated institutions
and large congregate living settings and placed into community-based
housing to enjoy a life similar to that which is enjoyed by most
Americans.
The deinstitutionalization movement has already proven that
individuals with disabilities can live successfully in the community with
varying degrees of support. Personal Assistance Services can be
individually designed to provide that support. Across the country, there
is a network of community providers, both public and private, that offer
a continuum of care including supported housing, respite, and supported
employment. These community-based providers must have adequate and
stable funding to ensure necessary treatment offered by the highest
credentialed staff.
Legislation to ensure that the money truly does follow the person into
the community will enable the availability of necessary funding for
individualized services. Once adequately funded, these services can
focus on recovery and resiliency that will prepare the individual with
disabilities to enjoy a more meaningful and productive life. Part of
fulfilling the Olmstead mandate is advocating for quality, state-of-the-art
disability services so that individuals can access affordable treatment by
qualified clinicians despite their location.
Moreover, individuals with disabilities need to be active participants
in their care and treatment decisions as well as active members of the
interdisciplinary teams that plan and design their services. Person-
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centered planning and personalized services should be the hallmark of
care. Today, person-centered teams meet to identify opportunities for
the individual with disabilities to develop personal relationships,
participate in their communities, increase control over their own lives,
and develop the skills needed to achieve these goals. Planning in
isolation, without involving the person with disabilities and other key
stakeholders, will not produce the most advantageous results. Gaining
input from everyone involved will create a symbiotic result, optimizing
all the community has to offer the individual and all the individual with
disabilities has to offer the community. Successful integration into the
community is the Olmstead goal that has yet to be fully realized.
Particularly in the field of mental health, the emerging view is that
individuals should only be hospitalized for short periods during acute
phases of their illness. Many community programs now offer Crisis
Stabilization Programs as the first option and an alternative to more
costly hospitalization in a psychiatric hospital. The Crisis Stabilization
Program can also be used as an interim placement after a necessary
hospitalization to reintegrate the individual back into the community.
These programs and integration efforts work to further dispel the myths
and stigmas surrounding mental and physical disabilities. Dispelling
stigmas is crucial because it is often such stigmas and myths that are
destructive to individual lives.
Many advances have been made in the medical and rehabilitation
fields that also make integration easier today. New generation
medications and psychosocial rehabilitation interventions are typically
used in combinations that allow most mental disorders to be treated
effectively without prolonged hospitalization. Great strides have been
made in medical interventions as well as in treatment modalities. Now
mental illnesses, like physical illnesses, are responding to these new
treatments with much promise. These advancements allow community
integration to be achieved more easily than ever before. Olmstead
should serve as a continuous catalyst for change as behavioral healthcare is transformed in America.
When individuals with disabilities are valued by society and are met
with compassionate, caring, and competent service providers who treat
them as collaborative partners, they become empowered individuals with
increased self-esteem. As respected and empowered individuals, they
can develop their abilities and skills to become fulfilled and productive
members of society. This dream became a reality for Ms. Curtis and Ms.
Wilson, but with the ten-year anniversary of the Olmstead decision
approaching, too much time has passed with too little real progress
achieved for the nation's largest minority. It was a hard-fought battle
but worth every effort because the decision obligated states to make this
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dream a reality for all citizens like Ms. Curtis and Ms. Wilson.
Aggressive action must be taken and stable funding must be provided to
ensure that every state can rapidly deliver on the Olmstead promise.
SAMANTHA A. DIPOLITO

